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L Facts
During the night of January 27,1994, Tessa Van Hart ("Van Hart") was
sodomized and murdered while making a pizza delivery outside of
Chincoteague, Virginia.' The murder remained unsolved for over two
years. Injune 1996, Brian Lee Cherrix ("Cherrix"), who was incarcerated
in the Accomack County Jail pending trial on unrelated charges, offered to
give the county sheriff information on the Van Hart murder in exchange for
a possible sentence reduction.2 Cherrix told the sheriff that his cousin, who
had passed away the preceding year, had murdered Van Hart and discussed
the killing with Cherrix' The state police, acting pursuant to Cherrix's
directions, then recovered from a creek near the murder scene a .22 caliber
rifle which Cherrix claimed his cousin had used to murder Van Hart.4
Cherrix recounted to police several different versions of the story of
how his cousin had killed Van Hart.' After investigating the cousin's
whereabouts on the night of the murder, the police determined that he was
not a plausible suspect. In April 1997, while incarcerated on another set of
unrelated charges, Cherrix requested to speak with a police officer and
subsequently confessed to the murder.7 Cherrix was convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to death based on the jury's finding of both vileness
and future dangerousness.8
IL Holding




4. Id. At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the rifle belonged to
Cherrix.
5. Id.




On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that all of Cherrix's
claims were either procedurally defaulted or lacked merit.
II. Analysis /Application in Virginia
Cherrix raised numerous issues on appeal. The court rejected several
claims in cursory fashion, adhering to its rulings in prior cases. 0 The court's
resolution of other claims turned on facts unique to the case, or provide
little guidance or explanation of use to defense counsel in the future." As
such, the court's disposition of only three of Cherrix's claims bears extended
discussion.
A. Adequacy of3:1 Mental Health Expert
Prior to trial, Cherrix filed a motion pursuant to section 19.2-264.3:1
("3:1") of the Virginia Code for the appointment of a mental health expert
and informed the trial court that he had "selected" an expert from Chester-
field County, Virginia." The trial court declined to appoint the requested
expert, instead appointing a local psychiatrist, Dr. John Bulette ("Dr.
9. Id., at *14.
10. The claims decided in this manner include the'following: (1) Virginia's statutory
aggravating circumstances of vileness and future dangerousness are unconstitutionally vague;
(2) Virginia's penalty stage instructions do not adequately inform-the jury of the concept of
mitigation; (3) the use of unadjudicated acts to prove future dangerousness without proof of
such acts beyond a reasonable doubt is unconstitutional; (4) the trial judge must be required
to reduce a jury's sentence of death to life imprisonment on a showing of good cause; (5) the
consideration of hearsay evidence or information in a presentence report at the sentencing
phase is unconstitutional; (6) the review provided by the Virginia Supreme Court in capital
murder cases is unconstitutional; (7) capital murder defendants have the right to individual
and sequestered voir dire of jurors; and(8) capital murder defendants have a constitutional
right to have a questionnaire mailed to potential jurors. Though rejected summarily, these
claims are preserved for further review.
11. The claims involved (1) the suppression of Cherrix's statements under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); (2) the Common-
wealth's obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to turn over to the defense
a statement made by Cherrix's grandmother, an alibi witness for the defense at trial; (3) the
reading and admission into evidence of a police officer's "question and answer session" with
Cherrix during which the officer asked Cherrix questions and then wrote down Cherrix's
responses; (4) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction; (5) the trial court's
refusal to give Cherrix's proposed jury instruction concerning the voluntariness of his
statements to police; and (6) the trial court's failure to instruct the jury pursuant to Simmons
v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), that Cherrix would be ineligible for parole if sen-
tenced to life in prison. The Court held this claim to be defaulted as Cherrix did not object
to the trial court's instruction that the jury should "have no concern with parole." Cherrix,
1999 WL 101077, at *11. However, it should be noted that Cherrix's counsel did not err in
failing to seek a Simmons instruction as the offense was committed prior to the Simmons
decision.
12. Cherrix, 1999 WL 101077, at *9.
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Bulette")-.3 On appeal, Cherrix argued that Bulette did not possess the
statutory qualifications to serve as a 3:1 expert as he had no prior experience
in capital murder cases and thus was not "qualified by specialized training
and experience to perform forensic evaluations."1" The court rejected this
argument, holding that the statute "simply requires specialized training and
experience to perform forensic evaluations,"'" and that a qualified 3:1 expert
need not possess experience in prior capital cases. 6
The court's resolution of Cherrix's 3:1 claim is reasonable. However,
several points regarding court appointed experts deserve mention. The
statute expressly provides that a defendant is not entitled to the mental
health expert of his own choosing.'" In Cherrix, defense counsel's choice of
words in informing the trial court that he had "selected" an expert was
perhaps unfortunate. Avoiding the use of that term by simply "recom-
mending" a particular expert to the court may be the better practice.
In order to maximize the possibility that the trial court will appoint
experts who will provide meaningful assistance to the defense, counsel
should research potential experts and obtain the commitment of a qualified
expert to join the defense team if appointed." Counsel should also deter-
mine that the expert can do the required work within the available time
frame. This information, along with the expert's fees and statutory qualifi-
cations, should be included with the 3:1 motion to make it easy for the trial
court to appoint the recommended expert. In addition, when seeking more
than one expert under 3:1, counsel should also gather preliminary evidence
on the need for the particular experts.' 9
13. Id.
14. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-364.3:1(A) (Michie 1998).
15. Cherrix, 1999 WL 101077, at *10.
16. Id.
17. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-364.3:1(A) (Michie 1998).
18. From the trial court's opinion, it seems dear that although Dr. Bulette may have
been a "qualified" expert under the statutory training requirements, he was not "qualified"
in terms of his ability to provide meaningful assistance to the defense. Counsel seeking
appointment of experts under 3:1 and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), are encouraged
to contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse to obtain information on potential
experts.
19. Multiple experts may be appointed under 3:1 as the statute expressly authorizes the
appointment of "one or more qualified mental health experts to evaluate the defendant and
to assist the defense." VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1(A) (Michie 1998) (emphasis added).
Although the statute grants indigent defendants the right to a minimum of one mental health
expert, when seeking multiple 3:1 experts defense counsel should present evidence to the
court as to why the single expert required by statute will be inadequate to properly assist the
defense with all potential mental health issues.
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In addition to 3:1, Ake v. Oklahoma2" may also provide the basis for
court appointment of a variety of experts. It should be noted that appoint-
ment of experts under Ake is completely distinct from appointment under
3:1 and nothing precludes counsel from attempting to secure one or more
experts under both Ake and 3:1.2" Upon a showing by the defendant that an
expert will assist the defense with an issue that will be a significant factor at
trial, Ake requires the appointment of a competent expert who will conduct
an appropriate examination.22 Although the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has held that Ake does not guarantee a defendant the
right to the effective assistance of expert witnesses, a viable argument exists
that, at a minimum, Ake guarantees what it says-a competent expert and an
appropriate examination.24 If counsel suspects that a particular Ake expert
is not meeting these minimal standards, the appropriate recourse is to file a
motion for a second expert to evaluate the original expert's performance.
Such a motion may provide a vehicle for ensuring that the principles under-
lying Ake are achieved and may in fact be required to avoid defaulting this
issue.25
Both Ake and 3:1 provide for the appointment of experts to serve as
members of the defense team. Dr. Bulette was not that. For example, Dr.
Bulette testified that Cherrix, who had previously shot his half-brother, had
"no remorse for the shooting."2 Additionally, Bulette testified that Cherrix
"had an anti-social personality, was 'angry with women,' and acted out this
anger by assaulting them."27 The Virginia Supreme Court relied on all of
this testimony in upholding the jury's finding of future dangerousness.2"
Counsel must do all in their power, and make the record where necessary,
to avoid being saddled with an "expert" who is not qualified to assist the
defense in any meaningful sense of the word.
B. Expert Corrections Witnesses
20. 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that when an indigent criminal defendant demon-
strates that his sanity at the time of the offense will be a "significant factor" at trial, the
defendant is entitled to "access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense").
21. Ake places no limit on the number of experts which a court may be required to
appoint to aid an indigent defendant.
22. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
23. Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1998).
24. See Anne Duprey, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 175 (1998) (analyzing Wilson v.
Greene, 155 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1998)).
25. See id
26. Cherrix, 1999 WL 101077, at *12.
27. Id.
28. Id.
422 [Vol. 1 1:2
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During the trial's penalty phase, Cherrix attempted to present the
testimony of an expert penologist, several officials from the Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections, a criminologist, a sociologist, and an inmate serving
a life sentence in a Virginia prison." Through these witnesses Cherrix
sought to defend against the Commonwealth's case for future dangerousness
by introducing evidence of what the Supreme Court of Virginia termed the
"general nature of prison life."3" The trial court refused to allow this testi-
mony, finding that "'what a person may expect in the penal system' is not
relevant mitigation evidence."" On appeal, Cherrix argued that this ruling
violated his constitutional right to present mitigating evidence as established
in Skipper v. South Carolina and Eddings v. Oklahoma.33
1. Eighth Amendment Analysis
Employing a narrow view of precedent, the court rejected the conten-
tion that Cherrix's evidence was relevant in mitigation and that he had an
Eighth Amendment right to present it as such.34 The court analyzed this
claim solely on Eighth Amendment grounds, and it is unclear from the
court's opinion whether Cherrix also based the claim on the Fourteenth
Amendment. As will be shown, this distinction may have proven critical.
The Eighth Amendment requires that the sentencer "not be precluded
from considering as a mitigating/actor, any aspect of a defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."" However, as the Virginia
Supreme Court noted, this principle "does not limit 'the traditional author-
ity of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defen-
dant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.'"36 Based
29. Id., at *10.
30. Id., at *11. According to the court, the inmate would have testified as to "what
prison life would be like for Cherrix if he received a life sentence." Id. The testimony of the
Department of Corrections officials would have concerned "the ability of the penal system
to contain Cherrix and the cost to the taxpayers of an inmate's life sentence." Id. The other
witnesses sought by Cherrix would have offered similar testimony. Id.
31. Id.
32. 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that Eighth Amendment requires admission of evidence
of capital defendant's successful adjustment to incarceration as mitigating evidence).
33. 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding that Eighth Amendment requires admission of
evidence of capital defendant's family history as mitigating evidence).
34. Cherrix, 1999 WL 101077, at *11.
35. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978)).
36. Cherrix, 1999 WL 101077, at *10 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 n. 12). The
court's rigid Eighth Amendment relevance analysis seems hard to reconcile with Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not bar the admis-
sion of victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial). It would seem that
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on a narrow reading of these passages, the Virginia Supreme Court con-
cluded that none of the evidence which Cherrix sought to present "concerns
the history or experience of the defendant"" and therefore that its exclusion
did not violate Cherrix's Eighth Amendment rights.38
In Skipper v. South Carolina,39 the United States Supreme Court held
that evidence regarding a capital defendant's ability to "make a well-behaved
and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character
that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing determination" ° and that the
Eighth Amendment thus compels its admission.4' The evidence at issue in
Skipper concerned the defendant's prior good behavior in prison.42 How-
ever, the Court's holding also extends to evidence of a defendant's ability to
adjust to prison life in the future, regardless of his prior experiences in
prison.43
The Virginia Supreme Court distinguished Skipper on the grounds that
"none of the evidence proffered at trial addressed Cherrix's ability to con-
form or his experiences in conforming to prison life, as the defendant's
evidence did in Skipper."" Based on this distinction, defense counsel must
ensure that all evidence offered in mitigation under the Eighth Amendment
is directly traceable to the defendant's "character, prior record, or the
circumstances of the offense," as the Virginia Supreme Court will doubtless
evidence of what a capital defendant may expect from a life sentence is as relevant to punish-
ment as victim impact evidence.
37. Cherrix, 1999 WL 101077, at *11.
38. Id. As the Virginia Supreme Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the scope
of relevant mitigating evidence under Lockett, the court did not consider whether the reality
of a life sentence may be considered mitigating evidence. In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that where a life sentence carries no
possibility of parole, due process requires that "the sentencing jury must be informed that the
defendant is parole ineligible." Id. at 156. The Court explicitly refused, however, to decide
whether a defendant's right to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility is also compelled by
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 162 n. 4. Thus, it did not decide the issue whether the Eighth
Amendment requires that a jury faced with only two sentencing choices is entitled to know
the reality of those choices.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter argued that the Eighth Amendment's require-
ment that a capital jury have accurate sentencing information also compelled the Court's
holding in Simmons. Id. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring). Failure to provide such information
"diminished the reliability of the jury's decision that death, rather than that alternative, was
the appropriate penalty in this case." Id. at 174. Based on this reasoning, an argument exists
that accurate sentencing information includes evidence of the living conditions of a person
serving a sentence of life without parole and that the Eighth Amendment thus compels its
admission.
39. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
40. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986).
41. id.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id. at 7.
44. Cherrix, 1999 WL 101077, at *11 n.4.
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continue to apply its narrow construction of mitigating evidence under Lockett,
Eddings, and Skipper. Defense counsel may accomplish this by presenting the
testimony of a witness who has interviewed the defendant and can testify that
life under the conditions existing in the "general nature of prison life" would
constitute punishment for the individual defendant. Such evidence bears directly
on the defendant and is admissible even under the Virginia Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
The Virginia Supreme Court analyzed the "general nature of prison life"
evidence proffered by Cherrix solely on Eighth Amendment grounds. How-
ever, this evidence is almost certainly admissible under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is a well-settled principle that the due process
clause prohibits the execution of a defendant sentenced to death "on the basis of
information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain."" In Simmons
v. South Carolina,' this principle was applied to require that where a life sen-
tence carries no possibility of parole, "the sentencing jury must be informed that
the defendant is parole ineligible."47 Similarly, the Court's holding in Skipper
that a defendant must be allowed to present evidence of his actual or foreseeable
good behavior in prison, was based on the Due Process Clause as well as on the
Eighth Amendment.' Taken together, these cases stand for the broad proposi-
tion that due process requires that a capital defendant be permitted to "rebut[]
information that the sentencing authority considered, and upon which it may
have relied, in imposing the sentence of death."49
If the Commonwealth elects to seek a death sentence based on the future
dangerousness aggravating factor, the factor becomes an express element of the
state's case for death.'o Based on the principles set forth in Gardner, Simmons,
45. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
46. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
47. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994).
48. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1980).
49. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 165. "When the prosecution urges a defendant's future
dangerousness as cause for the death sentence, the defendant's right to be heard means that
he must be afforded an opportunity to rebut the argument." Id. at 174 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
50. Virginia's capital sentencing statute provides that "a sentence of death shall not be
imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of
the defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society. . . ." VA. CODE
ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1998).
As this is an element of the offense, a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of future
dangerousness is a necessary prerequisite to the sentencing body even considering a death
sentence. See Brian S. Clarke, Case Note, CAP. DEF.J., Spring 1998, at 4 (analyzing Buchanan
v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998), and discussing the distinction between the eligibility and
selection phases of the penalty proceeding in Virginia).
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and Skipper, a capital defendant has a due process right to rebut the state's case
for future dangerousness. This right, which encompasses evidence of the
defendant's good behavior in prison and parole ineligibility, also includes
evidence of the "general nature of prison life," including the security and supervi-
sion measures that are so much a part of that regime. Such evidence may inform
the jury of the reduced likelihood that the defendant will commit criminal acts
of violence within the prison setting as well as the lowered probability that the
defendant will be able to escape and commit criminal acts in the outside world.
Counsel should also consider obtaining an expert witness to interview the
defendant and testify as to the defendant's capacity for future dangerousness."'
This due process argument for admission of "general nature of prison life"
evidence is distinct from mitigating evidence under the Eighth Amendment. As
such, the Fourteenth Amendment due process argument should not turn on
whether the evidence relates directly to the defendant's "character, prior record,
or the circumstances of the offense" as required by the Virginia Supreme Court's
interpretation of Lockett. Counsel should continue to consider the type of
evidence proferred in Cherrix and argue that both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments compel its admission.5
C A Troubling Application of the Vdeness Aggravating Factor
Cherrix was sentenced to death based on the jury's findings of both vileness
and future dangerousness. On a ppeal, he contended that no reasonable juror
could have concluded that his offense met the elements of either aggravating
factor. The court held that a reasonable juror could have found future danger-
ousness based on Cherrix's record of "continuing assaultive behavior" and on
the testimony of Dr. Bulette, Cherrix's mental health expert.5 3
Of potentially greater interest to defense counsel is the court's discussion
of the vileness aggravating factor. A finding of vileness requires that the sentenc-
ing body determine that the defendant's "conduct in committing the offense"
involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victimi.4 On
appeal, Cherrix argued that the record did not support a finding of either
depravity of mind or torture.
51. See Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the exclusion of the
testimony of a criminologist who had interviewed the defendant and would have testified as
to the defendant's future dangerousness was constitutional error). See also Alix M. Karl, Case
Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 61 (1998) (analyzing Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998)).
52. It is also important to preserve the record on both grounds. See Matthew K.
Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 393 (1999) (analyzing Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255
(4th Cir. 1999)). In Yeatts, the court of appeals held that a claim raised on Eighth Amend-
ment grounds in the trial court and on direct appeal is procedurally defaulted when raised on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds at federal habeas. Yeatts, 166 F.3d at 262.
53. Cherrix, 1999 WL 101077, at *12.
54. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1998).
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In Smith v. Commonwealth,5 the Virginia Supreme Court defined depravity
of mind as "a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing
that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation."' To
uphold the finding of depravity of mind in Cherrix, the court, without citing
Smith, regurgitated the facts of the case, beginning with Cherrix's sodomy of the
victim and ending with his statement to the police that the victim looked
"beautiful" after viewing her body at the funeral home. The court then sum-
marily concluded that "Cherrix's conduct in committing the sodomy and
murder. .. reflected depravity of mind.""7
The court found that Cherrix's sodomy of the victim at gunpoint while she
begged for her life constituted adequate evidence of torture.' Although a
narrowing construction for each of the vileness components is constitutionally
required by Godfrey v. Georgia,59 the Virginia Supreme Court has never adopted
a narrowing construction for "torture" and did not do so in this case. Thus, it
remains uncertain exactly what degree of conduct constitutes torture.
A vileness finding must be made based on the defendant's conduct "in
committing the offense. "' ° The court's depravity of mind analysis reveals its
willingness to expand the time frame during which the defendant "committ[ed]
the offense" in order to find vileness. From the court's opinion, with no chance
to defend or be heard on the issue, Cherrix learned or the first time what
conduct constitutes depravity of mind. The constitutional problems presented
by the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to consistently apply constitutionally
required narrowing constructions for the vileness components61 are discussed in
this volume in Hedrick v. Commonwealth' and Reid v. Commonwealth.'
David D. Leshner
55. 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978).
56. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978).
57. Cherrix, 1999 WL 101077, at *13.
58. Id.
59. 466 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that Georgia's vileness aggravating factor, which
includes the components of torture, depravity of mind and aggravated battery, is unconstitu-
tionally vague unless narrowing constructions are applied). Given that Georgia and Virginia
have identical vileness aggravating factors, it seems clear that Godfrey 's holding applies to the
Virginia statute.
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1998).
61. These concerns exist apart from the separate issue of whether the Smith narrowing
construction for the depravity of mind component is constitutionally adequate on its face.
It is the contention of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse that this narrowing construc-
tion is constitutionally inadequate. See Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse Trial Manual at
215-217.
62. See Kelly E.P. Bennett, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 429 (1999) (analyzing Hedrick
v. Commonwealth, Nos. 98-2205, 98-2056, 1999 WL 101079 (Va. Feb. 26, 1999)).
63. See Matthew K. Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 457 (1999) (analyzing Reid
v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1998)).
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